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Abstract
Increasing demand in securing (wireless) networks has recently resulted in tremendous amount of
research efforts in physical layer security. This work focuses on interference networks with secrecy
constraints.
• For the two user channel, a scheme that allows users to cooperatively inject (decodable and un-
decodable) randomness is proposed. The results unveil the role of interference in secure network
design.
•Next, the focus is shifted to arbitrarily high (but finite) number of users with asymptotically high
signal to noise ratios. Utilizing the interference alignment scheme, a non-zero secure degrees of
freedom is shown to be achievable at each user.
• Finally, random networks with large number of users is considered. Using tools from the percolation
theory, a multi-hop scheme, where independent randomization is added at every hop, is shown to
achieve the optimal scaling law under certain assumptions.
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• Eavesdropper observes a degraded version of the output seen by the intended receiver.
• Coding technique [1] : Add extra randomness to the channel, so that the mutual
information leakage rate to the eavesdropper
I(W ;Ye)
n can be made arbitrarily small.
1. Generate 2n(R+R
x) codewords and partition them into 2nR bins, where
each bin contains 2nR
x
codewords.
2. To send message w, choose a codeword in the bin w randomly and
transmit the corresponding codeword denoted by x(w,wx).
3. Set the rates such that R + Rx = I(X ;Y ) and Rx = I(X ;Ye). This
way, receiver recovers both the bin index (w) and the codeword index
(wx). Furthermore, the eavesdropper is totally confused due to this
code design and the secrecy requirement is satisfied.
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• The secrecy capacity is Cs = max
p(X)
I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Ye).
2-User Network: Cooperative Randomization
We assume that each transmitter k ∈ {1, 2} has a secret message wk ∈ Wk , {1, 2, · · · , 2nRk}
which is to be transmitted to the respective receiver in n channel uses and to be secured from the
external eavesdropper.
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The error probability at the receivers are defined as follows.
Pe,k ,
1
|W1||W2|
∑
(w1,w2)∈W1×W2
Pr {wˆk 6= wk|(w1, w2) is transmitted.}
We say that the rate tuple (R1, R2) is achievable for the IC-EE if, for any given ǫ > 0, there exists a
secret codebook such that,
max{Pe,1, Pe,2} ≤ ǫ −→ reliability of the transmission
1
nI(W1,W2;Ye) ≤ ǫ −→ secrecy of the transmission
for sufficiently large n.
The proposed scheme allows for cooperation in adding randomness to the channel in two ways:
•Cooperative binning −→ To add structured and decodable randomness
•Cooperative channel prefixing −→ To add unstructured and undecodable random-
ness
Here, the binning technique of [1] and the channel prefixing technique of [2] are cooperatively exploited.
The proposed scheme also utilizes the message-splitting technique of [3] to allow partial decoding of
the interfering signals.
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To probe further: The achievable region along with some special cases showing capacity and
sum-capacity results can be found in [4].
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K-User Network: Secure Degrees of Freedom
We now focus on the frequency/time selective K-user Gaussian interference channel with secrecy
constraints. Lets first consider the 3-user case with confidential messages.
1. Let F = 2m+1 for somem. This is the (2m+1)
symbol extension of the three-user channel con-
sidered in [5].
2. Employ interference alignment precoding using
the matrices V¯k of [5], so that the transmitted
signals are of the form X¯k(t) = V¯kX˜k(t), where
X˜k(t) represents the vector of mk streams trans-
mitted from user k.
3. The F dimensional received signal space at each
receiver is used to create mi interference free di-
mensions, spanned by the desired streams.
4. Receiver 1 now sees the m streams X˜2(t) and
m streams X˜3(t) mixed together in a multiple
access channel with only m dimensions.
5. The secrecy precoding of X˜2(t) and X˜3(t) en-
sures to completely secure m/2 streams. In the
limit of a large F = 2m + 1, this results in 1/4
secure DoF.
The beamforming matrices V¯k
satisfies the followings.
• The non-intended signals seen
by each receiver are aligned
within some low dimensional-
ity subspace.
• The intended streams span
the orthogonal subspace.
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This intuitive discussion is formalized as follows. For the K-user Gaussian interference channel with
confidential messages, a secure DoF of η = K−22K−2 per frequency-time slot is almost surely achievable
for each user.
To probe further: The results are extended to the external eavesdropper scenario, where
we design the scheme with a virtual transmitter corresponding to the eavesdropper, showing that
the secure DoF of η = K−12K is achievable. More interestingly, η =
1
2 − 1K per user is achievable in the
absence of the eavesdropper CSI by exploiting the channel ergodicity and permuting the users
to assure symmetry. Details can be found in [6].
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Large Networks: Secrecy Capacity
Scaling
The network is on a square of side-length
√
n. The legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers are assumed
to be placed randomly according to Poisson point processes of intensity λ = 1 and λe = O
(
(logn)−2
)
,
respectively. In such a network, we follow the footsteps steps of [7] to construct a highway backbone.
However, in addition to the interference constraint considered in [7], our multi-hop forwarding strategy
is designed to ensure secrecy.
Our achievability argument is divided into the following four key steps:
1. Secure rate per hop: We first use the idea of se-
crecy zone to guarantee the secrecy of the communi-
cation over a single hop. Key: Secrecy zone ap-
proach and bounding the interference on the
legitimate receiver via time-division scheme.
2. Securing a multi-path: Our novel multi-hop for-
warding strategy, which injects independent randomiza-
tion signal at each hop, is shown to allow for hiding the
information from an eavesdropper which listens to the
transmissions over all hops. Key: Independent ran-
domness injection.
3.Highway construction and secure rate per node
on the highway: Using tools from percolation theory,
we show the existence of a sufficient number of horizon-
tal and vertical highways. In particular, each highway is
required to serve O(
√
n) nodes and an entry (exit) point
has w.h.p. a distance of at most κ′ log(n) away from each
source (respectively, destination), where κ′ can be made
arbitrarily small. In addition, each node on the highway
can support a constant data rate. Key: Percolation
with dependent edges.
4. Securing a multi-path: Highways are shown to be ac-
cessible from almost all the nodes in the network with a
secure rate of Ω
(
(logn)−3−α
)
. Key: Taking advan-
tage of eavesdropper scaling.
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Our main result is then proved by combining the aforementioned steps with the following multi-hop
routing scheme.
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A typical multi-hop route consists of four
transmission phases:
1. From source node to an entry point on
the horizontal highway,
2. Across horizontal highway (message is
carried until the desired vertical high-
way member),
3. Across vertical highway (message is
carried until the exit node), and
4. From the exit node to the destination
node.
The main result is as follows. If the legitimate nodes have unit intensity (λ = 1) and the eavesdroppers
have an intensity of λe = O
(
(logn)−2
)
in an extended network, almost all of the nodes can achieve a
secure rate of Ω
(
1√
n
)
.
To probe further: Details can be found in [8], where we also show that the results also hold
for dense networks. In addition, if nodes share keys only with the corresponding closest highway
member, then the same scaling is achievable for any λe → 0. More interestingly, the scaling
result presented here is achievable even if the eavesdroppers collude.
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